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HORTLY after the conclusion of this year's Survey period, newly
released budget numbers indicated that Texas would be facing a
$9.9 billion shortfall between predicted expenses and predicted rev-
enue through the next biennium. In what some critics complain is a
neverending saga, debate continues about Texas franchise tax, about
whether and to what extent Texas should participate in the Streamlined
Sales Tax Project, and about how and whether meaningful property tax
reform will ever be effected. It is against the background of these and
other issues, as well as of the interpretations and policies outlined in this
article, that the 2003 Texas Legislature begins its task, and that we begin
our review of the Survey period.1
I. SALES TAX
A. APPLICATION OF THE TAX
Several Survey period cases and rulings addressed definitional issues
that delineate the scope of various exemptions. In Tennessee Gas Pipe-
line Co. v. Rylander,2 Tennessee Gas Pipeline, an entity authorized by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") to operate as a "com-
mon carrier pipeline," filed a refund suit to collect sales and use taxes it
paid in connection with the maintenance and repair of its aircraft. Ten-
nessee Gas, which owns and operates two aircraft that it uses to transport
employees and their executives and to inspect pipelines and rights-of-
way, argued persuasively that it is "a licensed and certificated carrier"
and that its expenses for repair and remodeling of the aircraft it operates
should therefore be exempt. Both Tennessee Gas and the Comptroller
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focused not only on Tax Code section 151.328 s but also on Rule 3.297, 4
which defines "licensed and certificated carrier" to include pipeline oper-
ators authorized to operate as common carriers by the appropriate state
or federal agency. The Comptroller, however, interpreted the Tax Code
section 151.3285 exemption as "limited to air common carriers certificated
by the Federal Aviation Agency ("FAA")."'6 Tennessee Gas appealed the
lower court's summary judgment in favor of the Comptroller, and argued
that Rule 3.2977 is unambiguous and that the Comptroller's present inter-
pretation conflicts with her prior interpretation. Tennessee Gas also com-
plained that the Comptroller's current interpretation constitutes an
implicit amendment of the Rule, in violation of rulemaking procedure.
Rule 3.297(a)(1) defines a "licensed and certificated carrier" as "a person
authorized by the appropriate United States agency or by the appropriate
state agency within the United States to operate an aircraft, vessel, train,
motor vehicle, or pipeline as a common or contract carrier transporting
persons or property for hire in the regular course of business."8 The
Comptroller asserted that, for purposes of the aircraft exemption, the
"appropriate" agency is the FAA, not the FERC. Giving great deference
to the Comptroller's rule and to the fact that the rule addressed not only
the aircraft exemption but also other non-aircraft "carrier" issues, the
court concluded that it "need not determine whether Tennessee Gas's
interpretation of the Rule is reasonable; we need only determine whether
the Rule can reasonably be read in the manner the Comptroller has cho-
sen to interpret it."
Concluding that the definition of certificated carrier had been drafted
for a much broader purpose than the aircraft exemption at issue, the
court held that the Comptroller's interpretation was reasonable. The
court also rejected Tennessee Gas's argument that other Comptroller in-
terpretations appear inconsistent with this case. Instead, the court found
that "[i]f anything, the uniformity of these [administrative] decisions with
respect to their focus on certification as an air common carrier by the
FAA strengthens, rather than weakens, the Comptroller's position."' 0
GATX Terminals Corp. v. Rylander1" revisited the frequently debated
distinction between remodeling and new construction. GATX is in the
business of operating "tank farms where petroleum and petrochemical
products are unloaded from transport vehicles" to be stored in tanks until
3. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.328 (Vernon 2002).
4. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.297 (West 2002).
5. TEX. TAX CO1E ANN. § 151.328 (Vernon 2002).
6. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 80 S.W.3d at 203.
7. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.297 (West 2002).
8. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.297(a)(1) (West 2002).
9. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 80 S.W.3d at 205.
10. Id. at 206.
11. GATX Terminals Corp. v. Rylander, 78 S.W.3d 630 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no
pet.). This opinion was substituted for GATX Terminals Corp. v. Rylander, No. 03-01-
00537-CV (Tex. App.-Austin Apr. 18, 2002) (not designated for publication), 2002 Tex.
App. LEXIS 2719, to address issues raised in the Comptroller's motion for rehearing.
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"ready to be loaded again for distribution." 12 GATX sought a refund of
sales tax paid with respect to repainting its tanks and making improve-
ments to bring the facility into compliance with environmental regula-
tions. GATX asserted that the repainting was nontaxable maintenance
and the environmental improvements were nontaxable new construction.
The Comptroller disagreed and contended that both were taxable real
property repair and remodeling. Rule 3.35713 lay at the heart of the dis-
pute. This Rule defines maintenance as "scheduled, periodic work neces-
sary to sustain or support safe, efficient continuous operations, or to
prevent the decline, failure, lapse, or deterioration of the improve-
ment. '' 14 Various Comptroller decisions have interpreted "scheduled" to
mean that the "work is arranged in advance rather than on an as-needed
basis," and "periodic" to mean performed at regular intervals rather than
prompted by a subjective judgment.1 5 Because the repainting was in the
discretion of GATX managers and done only on an as-needed basis, the
judge ruled that the repainting did not qualify under the Rule's definition
of maintenance. Rule 3.357 defines "new construction" as new improve-
ments to real property, whereas "remodeling" is defined as rebuilding,
replacing or upgrading existing real property. 16 Because the installation
of equipment to bring GATX's facility into compliance with environmen-
tal regulations modified only the way GATX delivered the products into
the tank, and not the amount of products loaded, it was held to be taxable
remodeling.
Cafeteria Operators, L.P. v. Rylander17 focused on the availability of an
exemption for gas and electricity. The taxpayer, which operates Furr's
Cafeterias, used a central kitchen to prepare foods, then shipped the
foods to the individual cafeterias for serving. The taxpayer argued on
appeal that "the electricity and gas used in the central kitchen during the
audit period qualified for exemption from sales tax."' 8 After an examina-
tion of the history underlying taxation of gas or electricity used in food
preparation, the court determined that food preparation in the central
kitchen was part of a continuous stream of activities to produce food
ready for consumption at Furr's Cafeterias. As a result, the court held
that the gas and electricity used in the central kitchen during the audit
period was taxable.' 9
12. GATX Terminals Corp., 78 S.W.3d at 632.
13. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.357 (West 2002).
14. Id. § 3.357(a)(7).
15. See, e.g., Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 28,468, 1992 Tex. Tax. LEXIS 376(Nov. 2, 1992); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,911 (Feb. 10, 1998).
16. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.357(a)(8), (11) (West 2002).
17. Cafeteria Operators, L.P. v. Rylander, 96 S.W.3d 460 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002,
pet. filed).
18. Id. at 460.
19. Id. at 463. This opinion was substituted for the July 26, 2002, opinion and judg-
ment, Cafeteria Operators, L.P. v. Rylander (Tex. App.-Austin July 26, 2002, no pet.) (not
designated for publication), 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 5398, which included a less thorough
discussion of the relevant legislative history.
20031 2029
SMU LAW REVIEW
As during every Survey period, administrative hearings addressed a
wide variety of topics, many of which are of limited interest; however,
several administrative decisions deserve discussion. In Hearing Number
39,933,20 the taxpayer paid for certain improvements to a facility pursuant
to lump-sum contracts. The facility had been owned previously but had
never been finished out for its intended use as a manufacturing facility.
A previous lessee had used the facility for storage but, pursuant to its
lease, was prohibited from using the HVAC system or fire sprinkler sys-
tem. The taxpayer argued that the improvements were new construction
because the facility, even though actually occupied, had not previously
been used for manufacturing. The Administrative Law Judge ("AL")
disagreed and held that the improvements were taxable nonresidential
repair and remodeling based on the fact that the improvements were not
the initial finish out work and did not add additional square footage. The
taxpayer also did not succeed in arguing that its purchases of manufactur-
ing equipment, including replacement parts, and cranes qualified for the
manufacturing exemption. The ALJ concluded that when this machinery
is used to re-manufacture items for customers, those items are not held
"for ultimate sale" because title to the remanufactured item always re-
mains with the customer. Consequently, the taxpayer's use of manufac-
turing equipment and cranes to remanufacture such items was held to be
a divergent use not eligible for the manufacturing exemption.
Several other administrative hearings also addressed the manufacturing
exemption.21 In Hearing Number 40,495,22 for example, the taxpayer,
who manufactured concrete blocks, argued that several pieces of equip-
ment were eligible for the manufacturing exemption. The AU sided with
the Administrative Hearings Section ("AHS") interpretation of the ex-
ceptions to the manufacturing exemption, rendering all of the equipment
in question taxable. First, a conveyor, chain elevator, rotating finger
transfer car, lowerator, rail set, and dynamic buffer were found to be tax-
able as intraplant transportation equipment and not part of the same
piece of exempt equipment. The conveyor was not considered part of a
larger piece of equipment because the purchase contract listed the con-
veyor separately from the equipment to which it delivered materials.23
20. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 39,933 (May 30, 2002).
21. See, e.g., Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 39,419, 2002 Tex. Tax LEXIS 102(Nov. 19, 2002); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 38,260 (Nov. 20, 2002); Tex. Comp.
Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 40,299 (July 24, 2002); see also Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing
No. 41343, 2002 Tex. Tax LEXIS 46 (July 18, 2002), and Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Letter No.
9907557L (July 8, 1999) (Alas, not only do french fries contribute too many calories and fat
grams to the American diet, they apparently also create confusion in the tax world; the
taxpayer in this hearing asserted that a letter from the Tax Policy Division of the Comptrol-
ler's office suggested the exact opposite outcome).
22. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 40,495 (Oct. 10, 2002).
23. Fact-sensitive inquiries into the language of contracts affected sales tax decisions in
other contexts as well. The decision in Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 37,948 (July 3,
2002), hinged on specific language in certain subcontractor contracts that showed sales tax
was included in the contracts. In that decision, the judge found that the provision within
the sales contract for "all Federal, state, county, municipal and other taxes imposed by law
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Other equipment items failed to qualify for exception because the ALJ
viewed them as components of a kiln, which is not considered one piece
of equipment but a room or building in which equipment resides. Sec-
ond, the ALJ concluded that a hydronix system that tested raw materials
outside the plant was taxable because activity prior to entry into the plant
does not qualify as part of the actual manufacturing process. Finally, the
ALJ also held taxable a mixer platform that supported several pieces of
exempt manufacturing equipment, reasoning that because it holds several
pieces of exempt equipment, it cannot be a part or component of any one
piece of equipment. The AU viewed the platform as more similar to
realty than personalty, and thus, non-exempt.
Hearing Number 40,24324 also addressed the manufacturing exemp-
tion, focusing again on a cement manufacturer. In the process of manu-
facturing cement, the taxpayer operated kilns that were partially fueled
by a tire recycling system. The taxpayer argued that the purchase and
installation of the tire recycling system qualified for the manufacturing
exemption. The ALJ found that equipment purchased before October 1,
1997 was exempt as it either powered the kilns and was part of the manu-
facturing process or alternatively made powering the kilns possible and
was exempt under the "one step removed from manufacturing" test.
Equipment purchased after October 1, 1997 was subject to a different
standard and was not exempt since it did not make or cause a physical or
chemical change to the cement.
In Hearing Number 40,939,25 the taxpayer, who had retail stores in
Texas, contended that the distribution of catalogs at its direction by a
third party to residents of Texas was not subject to use tax. The ALJ,
relying on Rule 3.346,26 concluded that "use" includes the purchase of
catalogs delivered into Texas at the taxpayer's direction. The fact that
shipment occurred outside of Texas and that the taxpayer did not techni-
cally hold title to the catalogs in Texas was not relevant to the Comptrol-
ler, who held that a taxable use occurred when the catalogs were
delivered at the taxpayer's request to Texas recipients.27
The taxpayer in Hearing Number 38,906,28 licensed by the United
States Postal Service to carry mail in certain areas, asserted that its air-
craft qualified for the exemption allowed to certain carriers. The tax-
or contract, and based upon labor, services, materials, equipment or other items ... per-
formed, furnished or used in connection with the work, including ... sales, use .... taxes
(including interest and penalties), whether stated separately, imposed by reason of per-
formance of the Work, or any materials, equipment, labor, services or other items in con-
nection with the Work," combined with the fact that sales tax was separately stated in
change orders to the contracts, was sufficient to prove that the contracts were sales-tax-
included.
24. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 40,243 (May 9, 2002).
25. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 40,939 (May 30, 2002).
26. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.346 (West 2002).
27. The catalog-use-tax issue continues to appear in numerous administrative hearings
and in Texas court cases.
28. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 39,806 (Nov. 13, 2001).
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payer used an aircraft to transport employees and executives to service
centers, contractor meetings, and contract negotiations, as well as to ser-
vice areas that needed additional drivers because of excess mail volume.
The taxpayer claimed that the aircraft was exempt from sales tax under
Tax Code section 151.328(a)(1). 29 However, the ALJ concluded that be-
cause the claimant was not a licensed or certificated carrier in the busi-
ness of using aircraft to transport persons or property for hire, the
exemption did not apply. The ALU also denied the claimant's contention
that the aircraft was exempt under Tax Code section 151.328(a)(4), 30 be-
cause there was no evidence presented that the aircraft was used and reg-
istered in one certain state before taxable use in Texas.3' Finally, with
regard to whether the aircraft was subject to use tax under Rule 3.297,32
the AU determined that a substantial presence must be established in
another state for the aircraft to be considered hangared outside of Texas.
Several hearings continue to refine and develop issues related to taxa-
bility of services.33 In Hearing Number 38,288, 34 taxpayers continued to
test the arguments set forth in the Raytheon case.35 The taxpayer in this
hearing was hired by the United States Department of Energy (the
"DOE") to manage certain facilities in Texas. The AL ruled that tele-
phone services purchased by the taxpayer were exempted because the
taxpayer was acting as the agent of the DOE in regard to phone services.
The ALU also found that janitorial services purchased by the taxpayer for
the facilities were non-taxable as they were purchased from a third party
for resale to the DOE as part of the management services provided, and a
resale certificate was provided to the third party supplier.
In Hearing Number 38,961,36 the taxpayer provided installation and
engineering services along with the purchase of store fixtures. The tax-
payer based his non-taxability argument on Rylander v. San Antonio
SMSA Ltd. Partnership,37 which made clear that multiple items, if distinct
and identifiable, should be analyzed separately for sales tax purposes
rather than necessarily treated as completely taxable or completely non-
29. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.328(a)(1) (Vernon 2002).
30. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.328(a)(4) (Vernon 2002).
31. Because the ALJ found the taxpayer evidence insufficient, he did not find it neces-
sary to reach the issue of whether the registration and use must occur in the same state; the
decision appears based more heavily on desired results than on statutory interpretation.
32. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.297 (West 2002).
33. See, e.g., Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 38,440 (Sept. 12, 2002) (surveyor
services); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 41,369 (Oct. 9, 2002) (information
services).
34. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 38,288 (Aug. 21, 2002).
35. Shortly after the end of the Survey period, this case was reviewed by the Court of
Appeals of Texas, Third District. The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that
the taxpayer was due a refund for purchases of overhead items charged as indirect costs to
contracts with the federal government. Strayhorn v. Raytheon E-Systems, 2003 Tex. App.
LEXIS 2522 (Jan. 30, 2003).
36. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 38,961 (Feb. 1, 2002).
37. Rylander v. San Antonio SMSA Ltd. P'ship, 11 S.W.3d 484 (Tex. App.-Austin
2000, no pet.). See Cynthia M. Ohlenforst et al., Taxation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 54
SMU L. REv. 1595, 1596-98 (2001).
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taxable, even if sold in a single transaction. The ALJ ruled that the ser-
vices provided were not tax-exempt because the taxpayer failed to pro-
vide information showing that the services were distinct and identifiable
from the purchase of the property. The taxpayer might have prevailed
had it been allowed to provide evidence that such services could be pur-
chased separately from the fixtures. 38
Some of the most interesting sales tax policy interpretations appeared
in ruling letters rather than in official rules or administrative cases. 39 Al-
though the statutory language in section 151.346 indicates that an exemp-
tion for certain services applies to affiliated entities, "at least one of
which is a corporation" 40 that report their income to the Internal Reve-
nue Service ("IRS") on a consolidated return for the year at issue, the
Comptroller had taken the position in a May 2002 ruling letter that only
affiliated entities formed as corporations under state law may qualify for
the exemption.41 In the face of substantial taxpayer insistence that the
exemption was intended to apply not only to "corporations" but also to
the broader category of affiliated "entities," the Comptroller's tax policy
staff and others within the agency met with taxpayers to review the statu-
tory language, the legislative history, and the history of the rules inter-
preting this exemption. The agency ultimately reconsidered its position
and concluded in a letter issued in early December 2002, that the exemp-
tion provided by Tax Code section 151.346 may extend to entities that are
not corporations under state law if the transaction occurs between affili-
ated entities recognized by the IRS as members of an affiliated group
within the meaning of Internal Revenue Code §§ 1504(a) or 1504(b), 42
the entities actually report their income to the IRS on a single consoli-
dated federal tax return for the year in which the transaction occurs, 43
and at least one member of the affiliated group is a corporation formed
under state law.44 The Comptroller also explicitly (and correctly) con-
cluded that "a limited partnership that checks the box to report income as
a corporation for federal income tax purposes [does] qualify for the sales
tax exemption if that limited partnership reports its income on a single
consolidated federal income tax return with other affiliated entities. '45 A
limited liability company that is a disregarded entity for federal income
tax purposes may also qualify for the exemption. This ruling illustrates
not only the Comptroller's willingness to meet with industry but also her
38. This hearing is one of the infrequent cases in which a taxpayer prevailed when
challenging a sample audit in an administrative hearing.
39. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.346 (Vernon 2002).
40. The services eligible for exemption under this statute are those which first became
taxable in 1987, including data processing and information services as well as certain other
services.
41. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Letter No. 200205124L (May 31, 2002).
42. 26 U.S.C. § 1504(a), (b) (2000).
43. This is the case except to the extent the affiliated entities are excluded from filing
on a consolidated return under 26 U.S.C. § 1504(b).




willingness to reverse agency policy in order to reach the correct conclu-
sion. The agency continues to deny the exemption to a partnership that
reports its income to the IRS on Form 1065, although technically such an
entity would also fall within the statutory language of section 151.346.46
Another recent ruling47 offers guidance to radio and television broad-
cast stations that intend to take advantage of the statutory exemption for
the purchase of certain FCC-required digital equipment, including digital
transmission equipment. 48
A September 24, 2002, ruling 49 confirms the policy expressed in a prior
ruling5° that a direct pay permit holder would owe no Texas use tax if it
purchases equipment in Texas, stores it in Texas and then ships it out of
the state. The letter explains that a direct pay permit holder agrees to
accrue or pay use tax on all of its purchases, may purchase and store a
taxable item in Texas, and may subsequently ship the taxable item out of
state "prior to any use other than storage."' 51 In that circumstance, the
direct pay permit holder does not owe any use tax on the taxable item.
The taxability ruling further notes that "[w]hat is relevant in determining
whether a direct pay permit holder owes tax is first use not first
storage."52
A May 6, 2002, letter offers a recent example of the Comptroller's ef-
forts to determine fairly how items should be taxed when taxable and
non-taxable items are sold together.5 3 This letter involved the sale of
non-taxable food products such as coffee and fruit with taxable items
such as decorative tents and baskets. The Comptroller points out that the
taxability of the complete product "is determined by the 'essential nature'
of the product. ' 54 This particular letter seems to focus on the cost factor;
the letter points out that if the "taxable items are not the primary compo-
nent (predominant cost factor) of the package the entire sales price of the
package is exempt."'55 Note, however, that if the portion that is resold is
treated as non-taxable on the resale, then the seller must pay tax on the
taxable components of the items at the time the seller purchases them.56
46. Id.
47. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Letter No. 200212663L (Dec. 30, 2002). Although this
ruling was not published until after the Survey period, the Comptroller had orally con-
firmed the conclusions set forth in the letter much earlier. In addition to answering several
questions about the exemption for digital equipment, the ruling letter includes a non-ex-
haustive list of examples of equipment that can qualify for the exemption.
48. See TEX. TAX CooE ANN. § 151.3185 (Vernon 2002).
49. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Letter No. 200209450T (Sept. 24, 2002).
50. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Letter No. 9505167L (May 5, 1995). This document com-
prises a response to a question posed by a Comptroller employee with respect to appropri-
ate treatment of a taxpayer.
51. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Letter No. 200209450T (Sept. 24, 2002) (emphasis added).
52. Id.
53. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Letter No. 200205051 L (May 6, 2002).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. This ruling also notes that admissions to food tasting parties are taxed as sales of
food - just in case you were wondering.
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Multiple letters address the apparently neverending quest to determine
what services are taxable under Texas law. Because many of these rulings
are fact-specific and because, unfortunately, they do not always present a
consistent analysis, it remains unclear which services are taxable and
which are not. Several letters, which address different fact patterns in-
volving security services, point out that the "Board of Private Investiga-
tors and Private Security Agencies requires persons that perform
investigations in Texas to be licensed," and then conclude that services
provided by licensed providers are generally taxable security services. 57
Unfortunately, the Comptroller's auditors sometimes make the error of
concluding that any service provided by a company with a security license
is a taxable service rather than analyzing the taxability of the services
provided. A letter dated December 11, 2001,58 which states that drafting
work performed for attorneys in preparation of a patent filing is a taxable
service, appears to overlook the "essence of the transaction test," and is
in some respects inconsistent with the ruling noted above regarding food
baskets. 59 In addition, the December letter illustrates the difficulty both
taxpayers and the Comptroller's staff face in determining at what point
"the use of a computer" makes a service taxable. At the time data
processing and information services first became taxable in 1987, many of
the services currently provided on a routine basis were simply not availa-
ble. It is interesting, and encouraging, to note that in her more recent
rulings and conversations, the current Comptroller, Carol Keeton
Strayhorn, and her staff recognize that the use of a computer in connec-
tion with providing a service should not result in automatically character-
izing the services as taxable-although that message has not yet traveled
to all the Comptroller's auditors, attorneys and judges.
B. REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
The Comptroller amended several sales tax rules during the Survey pe-
riod, although many of the rule revisions reflect recent legislative changes
rather than significant policy changes in the Comptroller's office. Rule
3.300 is one of the most significant of the revised rules. 60 This rule imple-
ments the significant changes enacted by the 2001 Legislature with re-
spect to the divergent use of manufacturing equipment that occurs on or
after October 1, 2001.61 The rule includes a formula that determines,
based on either output or hours, the appropriate measure of tax. The rule
further confirms that no tax is due if the divergent use occurs in any
month after the fourth anniversary of the equipment's purchase. (The
57. See, e.g., Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Letter No. 200203839L (Mar. 4, 2002).
58. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Letter No. 200112685L (Dec. 11, 2001) (another ruling
which concluded that drafting work performed for attorneys in preparation of the patent
filing is a taxable service and might-"when the computer is utilized"-become taxed as
data processing services).
59. See supra note 55 (food basket footnote) and accompanying text.
60. 27 Tex. Reg. 6537 (July 23, 2002) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. COE § 3.300).
61. See TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.3181 (Vernon 2002).
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amount of the divergent use is based on a forty-eight month phasing-out
period.)
The Comptroller also adopted amendments to Rule 3.28662 to imple-
ment changes made to section 151.05263 of the Tax Code that allow a
printer to accept a multi-state exemption certificate from a purchaser
when the printed materials are produced by a website or rotogravure
printing processes and materials are delivered by the printer to either a
fulfillment house or the United States Postal Service for distribution to
third parties located both inside and outside of Texas. Other sales tax
rule changes relate to criminal offenses and penalties as well as process-
ing returns and forms electronically. 64 The Comptroller also amended
Rule 3.302 regarding accounting methods, credit sales, bad debt deduc-
tions, repossessions, interest on sales tax, and trade-ins. 65 Note that sub-
section (h)(1) of this amended rule provides that tax paid on account that
subsequently becomes a bad debt will not be considered tax paid in error
and will not accrue interest under section 111.064.66 The Comptroller
also amended rules concerning water-related exemptions, 67 Texas emis-
sions plan reduction surcharge, 68 off-road heavy-duty diesel construction
equipment, 69 tax exempt organizations, 70 and taxpayer's bond or other
security.71 Several services rules were also amended, including those with
respect to debt collection services, 72 real property services, 73 and non-
residential real property repair, remodeling and real property
maintenance. 74
Although the Comptroller issued a draft version of revisions to Rule
3.33075 to distinguish between taxable data processing and non-taxable
internet advertising, the rule had not yet been officially proposed by the
end of this Survey period, perhaps because the distinction between taxa-
ble and non-taxable is so difficult to define.
The Comptroller is also working on several draft rules, including a new
version of the telecommunications rule, as she seeks to adopt by formal
regulation her policy with respect to certain telecommunications
receipts.76
62. 27 Tex. Reg. 8952 (Sept. 20, 2002) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.286).
63. TEX. TAX CODE § 151.052 (Vernon 2002)
64. See, e.g., 27 Tex. Reg. 4723 (May 31, 2002) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3.281) (addressing required records and information reflected of changes to TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 151.025 (Vernon 2002)).
65. 27 Tex. Reg. 10744 (Nov. 15, 2002) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.302).
66. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.064 (Vernon 2002).
67. 27 Tex. Reg. 9386 (Oct. 9, 2002) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.318).
68. 27 Tex. Reg. 2051 (Mar. 19, 2002) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.320).
69. 27 Tex. Reg. 2051 (Mar. 19, 2002) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.320).
70. 27 Tex. Reg. 111.60 (Dec. 2, 2002) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.322).
71. 27 Tex. Reg. 6537 (July 23, 2002) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.327).
72. 27 Tex. Reg. 9386 (Oct. 9, 2002) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.354).
73. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.356.
74. 27 Tex. Reg. 947 (eff. Feb. 17, 2002) (codified at 34 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.357).
75. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.330 (data processing).




A. APPLICATION OF THE TAX
Universal Frozen Foods Co. v. Rylander77 affirmed the trial court's
holding that the "additional tax" is valid. 78 The court ruled that the issue
of validity is controlled by Rylander v. 3 Beall Brothers 3, Inc.,V9 in which
the same court concluded that the additional tax is constitutional despite
the fact that fiscal year taxpayers may pay more tax than calendar year
taxpayers. Universal Frozen Foods Co. attempted to distinguish itself, re-
lying on Bullock v. Sage Energy Co.,80 because it did not make an elec-
tion to be a fiscal year taxpayer, but rather was a fiscal year taxpayer by
virtue of the fact that its parent corporation used a fiscal year. However,
the court concluded that, because the parent corporation was a fiscal year
taxpayer as the result of a voluntary election, rather than an involuntary
imposition by the Comptroller or other governmental authority, Beall
Brothers controlled. Universal further argued that the earned surplus
used to calculate its additional tax was improper because the gain from
the sale of its assets was reported by its parent corporation. Universal
joined in the filing of a consolidated return with its parent corporation
throughout its existence. Upon the sale of Universal's stock, an Internal
Revenue Code § 338 election was made to treat the sale of stock as a
deemed asset sale. Universal asserted that because the gain on the
deemed asset sale was ultimately reported by the parent corporation on
the consolidated return, it should not have been included in Universal's
earned surplus. The judge rejected this argument, based on his conclu-
sion that it contradicts the plain meaning of Tax Code section 171.110(h),
which prohibits consolidated reporting.81
As noted earlier, in Beall Brothers82 the court found application of the
"additional tax," enacted in 1991, constitutional. Rylander v. Palais
Royal, Inc.,83 relates to Beall's August 2, 1993, cessation of business in
Texas for franchise tax purposes due to its merger with Palais Royal. As
the court points out, because of its fiscal year, Beall's first tax report fol-
lowing the 1991 franchise tax amendments was due on May 15, 1992, and
according to the Comptroller, Beall was required to report its franchise
tax based in part on income earned in 1990, whereas a calendar year tax-
payer would have been obligated to include only 1991 income in its re-
port year. After paying the disputed tax under protest, Beall filed suit for
77. Universal Frozen Foods v. Rylander, 78 S.W.3d 588 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no
pet.).
78. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0011 (Vernon 2002).
79. Rylander v. 3 Beall Bros. 3, Inc., 2 S.W.3d 562 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, pet.
denied).
80. Bullock v. Sage Energy Co., 728 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
81. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.110(h); See also, 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §3.555(e)
(West 2002).
82. 3 Beall Bros. 3, Inc., 2 S.W.3d at 562.




a refund. The district court concluded, somewhat surprisingly in view of
prior cases involving the additional tax, that the earned surplus amend-
ments were unconstitutional as applied to Beall and that Beall was enti-
tled to a business loss carryover. 84 The appeals court reversed the district
court's holding on this issue and found that: (1) the additional tax statute
was not unconstitutional; (2) the earned surplus amendments do not con-
flict with state or federal retroactivity laws or due process provisions; and
(3) Beall should not be allowed a portion of the business loss carryover
for its 1992 report year as if it had been a calendar year taxpayer.8 5 In
summary, the court held that "the earned-surplus amendments are consti-
tutional. There is nothing in the tax code indicating that a business-loss
carryover should be calculated for a period different from that for which
the earned surplus is calculated. '86
Although not a Texas case, Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Commissioner8 7
merits reference. In reversing the holding of the appellate tax board, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court88 held that Sherwin-Williams
should be entitled to deduct royalties and interest it had paid to its Dela-
ware affiliates. The court concluded that the appellate board had "erred
when it found that the transfer and licensing back transactions between
Sherwin-Williams and its subsidiaries were without economic substance
and therefore a sham."8 9 Although Massachusetts law differs from Texas
law, a taxpayer victory in the face of state efforts to minimize or eliminate
deductions for expenses paid to affiliated companies is worth at least a
quick mention.
Hearing Number 41,11490 involved a multi-media entertainment retail
seller of books, music, software videos, DVDs, and periodicals. The tax-
payer filed an amended franchise tax report for 1997 seeking to correct
accounting errors that understated its cost of goods sold. The taxpayer
asserted that the accounting changes were required by the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") and should be taken into account for
franchise tax purposes. The taxpayer therefore filed an amended report
prior to the expiration of the four-year statute of limitations. The Comp-
troller rejected the amended return and claim for refund because the pro
forma numbers from the accounting period ending January 31, 1996, did
not actually appear on an amended 1996 federal income tax return. Since
the statute of limitations had expired for filing an amended federal in-
come tax return, the taxpayer was prevented from amending its federal
return. The AHS argued that "any amendments to a Texas franchise tax
report must be based on a final adjustment to the taxpayer's relevant
84. However, the district court granted the Comptroller's motion for summary judg-
ment with respect to the officer and director compensation add-back issue.
85. Palais Royal, Inc., 81 S.W.3d at 916-17.
86. Id. at 917.
87. Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Comm'r, 778 N.E.2d 504 (Mass. 2002).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 508.
90. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 41,114 (June 28, 2002).
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federal income tax return" and that because the franchise tax numbers
were not based on an amended federal tax return, they would not be
accepted. 9' Because the Tax Code requires that earned surplus calcula-
tion begin with a determination of "reportable federal taxable income, '92
the taxpayer could argue that the correct number was the "reportable"
number. The taxpayer unsuccessfully argued that section 171.110(a)(1) 93
allows a change if one is mandated by an audit or other adjustment by
"another competent authority," which, according to the taxpayer, should
include the SEC. Interestingly, the AHS, according to the opinion, in-
sisted that the taxpayer's amended report could not be accepted because
the earned surplus figures were based on federal taxable income that had
not been reported to the IRS. However, in certain other contexts, tax-
payers are not only permitted to base their earned surplus on amounts
that have not been reported on a federal income tax return, but are (for
example, in the context of an S corporation) required to report numbers
that are not reported on a federal tax return.
Hearing Number 41,24294 involved a taxpayer in a software vending
business that sought to take advantage of a net operating loss incurred by
a Hawaii corporation. As the decision notes, the record is unclear as to
whether the Hawaii corporation was merged into the taxpayer, but the
ALJ concluded that such a finding was unnecessary to resolve the case.
The Comptroller's interpretation of the applicable law was that the busi-
ness loss of one corporation cannot be transferred to another even when
a merger is involved. The Comptroller, therefore, denied the taxpayer's
claim for a refund based on business losses from the Hawaii corporation,
noting that the Hawaii corporation had officially terminated its existence
and that the petitioner-taxpayer had separately been incorporated there-
after. More interesting than this conclusion from the administrative law
judge is the following comment:
Possibly, the [Hawaii] Corporation could have been converted from
a Hawaii corporation to a Texas corporation pursuant to TEX. BUS.
CORP. ACT § 5.17 to satisfy Petitioner's business objectives and
preserve the business losses. However, that was not done. The [Ha-
waii] Corporation's existence was terminated, and separately Peti-
tioner's existence was created . . .95
The suggestion that a conversion might have permitted the business
losses to be preserved is consistent with another Comptroller letter 96 con-
firming that a corporation that converts to a Texas limited liability com-
pany, and then converts to a Nevada limited liability company, will be
able to use the Texas business loss carryover of the pre-conversion
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.110(a)(1) (Vernon 2002).
94. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 41,242 (June 24, 2002).
95. Id.




Comptroller Hearing Number 40,61198 focused on a taxpayer's conten-
tion that its "reportable federal taxable income" should take into account
certain adjustments to the basis of its depreciable assets when the tax-
payer first becomes subject to the federal income tax. The taxpayer as-
serted that because Texas "like other states, has adopted federal tax law
into its statutes regarding earned surplus computation, the 'federal basis'
adjustment under 1.1016-4 should apply to the earned surplus computa-
tion." 99 The taxpayer asserted that Texas should follow the California
course of allowing a taxpayer to adjust the amount of its gain for depre-
ciable assets sold during a report period. The AU determined, however,
that Texas statutes, unlike California statutes, do not specifically incorpo-
rate § 1016 and that the California decision was therefore inapplicable.1 00
As in past years, ruling letters address multiple key issues. Letters is-
sued during the Survey period confirm that net operating losses will sur-
vive sequential conversions, 10 1 and set forth the Comptroller's
determination that transporting electricity is a service, sourced for gross
receipts purposes to the location where the services are performed, but
that sales of electricity are sales of tangible personal property and there-
fore sourced to the delivery location.1 0 2 In an interesting pair of letters,
the Comptroller concluded that a taxpayer whose business cards have a
local address and phone number may not qualify for protection from the
earned surplus tax by reason of Public Law 86-272,1°3 but that "merely
handing out business cards with a salesperson's local telephone number,
without a local address," would not cause a taxpayer to lose Public Law
97. Because of the popularity of conversions in the context of state tax planning, it
remains important to confirm the federal income tax treatment of such transactions. The
check-the-box regulations (Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (as amended in 1999) and § 301.7701-3(as amended in 2001), which enable certain business entities to elect how they will be
characterized for federal tax purposes) accord significant flexibility on the federal income
tax side. Nonetheless, federal tax issues cannot be ignored, and the IRS eased many minds
this year by issuing F.S.A. 200237017 in which the National Office confirmed that in certain
instances a corporation that (i) converted into a limited partnership and then (ii) elected
under check the box regulations to treat the state law partnership as a corporation for
federal tax purposes could be treated as if it had effected a tax-free reorganization under
26 U.S.C. § 368(a)(1)(F) (2000). See also Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. GA-0007 (2003) (con-
cluding that a converted corporation or limited partnership must apply for an amended
bingo license to the extent the name or address of the converted entity differs from that of
the original entity). Although this ruling focuses on bingo, it is a useful reminder that there
are many circumstances in which Texas licensing or other legal considerations will be af-
fected by a conversion.
98. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Letter No. 40,611 (Sept. 27, 2002).
99. Id.
100. Taxpayers and the Comptroller continue to struggle with determining when and to
what extent federal income tax principles control franchise tax, a task made even more
difficult by the fact that the current Texas Tax Code references the Internal Revenue Code
as in effect for the tax year beginning on or after Jan. 1, 1996, and before Jan. 1, 1997, and
the regulations applicable to that period instead of the current IRC.
101. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Letter No. 200206204L (June 21, 2002).
102. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Letter No. 200202819L (Feb. 25, 2002).
103. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Letter No. 200210497L (Oct. 8, 2002); Pub. L. No. 86-272,
73 Stat. 555 (1959) (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-84 (2000)).
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86-272 protection. 10 4 The Comptroller also ruled that a limited liability
company that is treated as a disregarded entity for federal income tax
purposes is entitled to an exemption from the franchise tax on the
grounds that it is deemed to be tax exempt because it is considered a part
of its tax exempt parent.10 5
B. REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
The Comptroller adopted only a few changes to the franchise tax rules
this year. In the franchise tax area as in the sales and administrative ar-
eas, the Comptroller sought to clean up and modify rules to take into
account legislative changes and to state more clearly Comptroller policy.
She proposed changes to Rule 3.557106 concerning the apportionment of
earned surplus. As proposed, the rule amendments add definitions and
additional information concerning legal domicil and location of payor; if
amended as proposed, the rule would also make explicit that taxable in-
come for federal income tax purposes may differ from reportable federal
tax income for franchise tax purposes to the extent that the Internal Rev-
enue Code, upon which the Franchise Tax Code relies, is different from
the currently effective Internal Revenue Code. The Comptroller also
adopted an amendment to Rule 3.560107 and amendments concerning
franchise tax credits l08 and Rule 3.580.109
III. PROPERTY TAX
A. APPLICATION OF THE TAX/EXEMPTIONS
In Dallas Central Appraisal District v. Wang,1" 0 the Dallas Court of Ap-
peals added to the reasons that it is "buyer beware" with respect to real
property sales. The property at issue, a residence, was owned by a Mr.
Vines until his death in August 1998.111 Mr. Vines rightfully claimed the
over-65 and homestead exemptions on the property in 1998, but these
exemptions were incorrectly carried over to the 1999 tax year.'1 2 The
Wangs purchased the residence in August 1999; in connection with the
closing, the Wangs' title company obtained a certificate from a private
entity showing no property taxes were due on the residence. 1' 3 Several
months after the Wangs acquired the residence, the appraisal district noti-
104. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Letter No. 200210497L (Oct. 8, 2002) (emphasis added).
105. However, the LLC is qualifying as a tax exempt entity on the basis of its sole
member and not as an organization that has itself applied for and received its own letter of
determination from the IRS and is therefore not eligible for a sales tax exemption.
106. 27 Tex. Reg. 6812 (Aug. 2, 2002) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.557).
107. 27 Tex. Reg. 10746 (July 12, 2002) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.560).
108. See 27 Tex. Reg. 6325 (July 12, 2002) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.579-
.580 (credit for hiring the disabled)).
109. 27 Tex. Reg. 6324 (July 17, 2002) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.569).
110. Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Wang, 82 S.W.3d 697 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, no
pet.).





fied the Wangs of the district's intent to remove the exemptions for the
1999 year and back-appraise the residence to add this taxable value to the
2000 tax year roll. 1 4 The Wangs asserted that this tax lien was unconsti-
tutional; the essence of their argument was that the Texas Constitution
prohibits taxpayers from being burdened by tax liabilities of previous
owners.
115
Although the appellate court repeatedly stated that its ruling produces
a harsh, inequitable result to the Wangs, the court reversed the trial court
and held that the back-appraisal of taxes on the Wangs' property does not
violate the Texas Constitution.'" 6 The appellate court first concluded that
the appraisal district was required to assess the residence for the improp-
erly granted exemption once the district discovered that taxable property
had escaped taxation. 1 7 Given that the appraisal district made this de-
termination in late 1999, the appraisal district's only choice was to add the
taxable value to the 2000 tax rolls. 18 Although the 2000 tax year started
after the Wangs acquired the residence, the court reasoned that the lien
for these taxes existed on January 1, 1999, before the Wangs acquired the
residence, and thus the lien for the back-taxes followed the residence into
the Wangs' hands." t9 Moreover, the court noted that the Wangs could
have averted this liability by obtaining, before purchase, a tax certificate
from the relevant taxing units (not from a private company) showing no
taxes due; by failing to do so, the Wangs assumed the risk.120
Finally, the court examined the Wangs' argument that the lien on the
residence violated Article VIII, section 15 of the Texas Constitution, 21
which the Wangs asserted allows only the delinquent taxpayer's property
to be sold to pay delinquent taxes. Article VIII, section 15 provides that
(1) a tax lien attaches annually to real property for assessed taxes; (2) the
taxing unit can sell all of a delinquent taxpayer's property to pay delin-
quent taxes; and (3) "such property may be sold for the delinquent taxes
owed." 22 The Wangs asserted that "such property" refers only to prop-
erty in category (2) above, and thus implicitly disallows the sale of prop-
erty not owned by the delinquent taxpayer. The court rejected this
argument, holding that "such property" refers to property in categories
(1) and (2) above. 123
114. Id.
115. TEX. CONST. art. VilI, § 15.
116. Wang, 82 S.W.3d at 706.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 703. Back-appraised value is added to the current year's tax roll and does
not retroactively change the tax rolls for the year or years in which the exemption was
improperly granted. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.21 (Vernon 2002).
120. Wang, 82 S.W.3d at 704.
121. TEx. CONST. art. Vill, § 15.
122. Wang, 82 S.W.3d at 704.
123. Id. The court acknowledged that its holding puts transferees in a very difficult
position in having to defend exemptions granted to their predecessors, and even states that
the results can be draconian. Id. at 702. Because the Wangs did not raise the type of
arguments that would allow the court to consider these issues, the court stated that it could
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The Austin Court of Appeals in Gables Realty Ltd. Partnership v.
Travis Central Appraisal District124 considered the often perplexing issue
of taxation of government-owned property leased to a private entity. In
this case, the land at issue was owned by government entities, and was
leased to Gables Realty, a non-governmental entity.125 Gables Realty
then constructed apartments on the leased property.'2 6 The lease pro-
vided that Gables Realty would pay all property taxes on the property.1 27
The use of the property for apartments was a commercial, non-public
purpose; thus, the government entities were not entitled to an exemption
under section 11.11128 for public property used for a public purpose. Ga-
bles Realty asserted that the land should be (a) listed in the name as
Gables Realty, and (b) appraised under section 25.07129 at the market
value of its leasehold interest in the land, rather than the land's market
value. 130
Section 25.07 provides, inter alia, that a leasehold interest in real prop-
erty that is exempt to the owner shall be listed in the name of the
lessee.131 Section 23.13132 provides that such leasehold interest is valued
at (a) the market value of the leasehold (which would be zero if the rent
is at least at market rates), but may not be less than the total rent paid for
the leasehold interest for the relevant year.' 33 The court rejected Gables
Realty's position because the court concluded that section 25.07 applies
only if the property is exempt to the owner; thus, because the governmen-
tal entities were not eligible for an exemption on the land at issue due to
its commercial use, section 25.07 could not apply to the land. 134 The end
result under this decision is that the land is taxed at full market value to
the governmental entities, but that Gables Realty is required to pay such
taxes under the terms of the lease.
Panola County Appraisal District v. Panola County Fresh Water Supply
not consider these issues. Id. The court strongly intimated, however, that had these issues
been raised, the result would have been different. Id.
124. Gables Realty Ltd. P'ship v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 81 S.W.3d 869 (Tex.
App.-Austin 2002, pet. denied).
125. Id. at 870.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.11 (Vernon 2002).
129. Id. § 25.07.
130. Gables Realty, 81 S.W.3d at 871.
131. TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.07 (Vernon 2002).
132. Id. § 23.13.
133. Id.
134. Gables Realty, 81 S.W.3d at 875. Gables Realty appropriately argued that language
in Univ. Christian Church v. City of Austin, 789 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no
writ) supported its position. In this case, the court upheld a jury verdict that a church-
owned parking lot leased to a private entity was taxable. Univ. Christian Church, 789
S.W.2d at 365. The court noted that the taxing units "could tax [the lessee's] leasehold
estate instead of the church's property interest." Id. In response to language that is clearly
inconsistent with the holding in Gables Realty, the court merely notes that such language is
dictum. Gables Realty, 81 S.W.3d at 875.
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District No. One135 also addresses the taxation of leasehold interests in
real property owned by a tax-exempt entity, and focuses on how to value
a taxed leasehold interest. In Panola County, the water district owned
lakeside lots and leased them to private entities.' 36 The lots were exempt
in the hands of the water district but the leasehold interests were taxed to
the lessees under section 25.07.137 These lots apparently were highly
sought; indeed, many lessees were able to sell their leaseholds for a pre-
mium (i.e., the purchaser assumed the lease payments and paid the seller
an up-front cash payment to acquire the leasehold interest). 138 The ap-
praisal district assigned taxable values to the leasehold interests that were
greater than the yearly rent. 139 The water district challenged such valua-
tions, asserting that the appraisal district had improperly included in the
taxable value the water district's reversionary fee simple interest. 140 The
trial court held in favor of the water district, concluding that the value of
the leasehold interests should be based solely on the rent paid for each
lot.' 4 ' The court of appeals reversed the trial court, reasoning that sec-
tion 23.13142 does not limit the taxable value of leasehold interests to con-
tract rent. 143 Indeed, section 23.13 expressly states that contract rent is
the floor for taxable values, not the ceiling. 144 The court did, however,
instruct the trial court not to treat fee simple interests as comparable to a
leasehold interest.145
In Tex-Air Helicopters, Inc. v. Galveston County Appraisal Review
Board,146 the Houston Court of Appeals said in seventeen pages what
others might have told the appraisal district in three words: give it up.
Yet again, the appraisal district challenged the constitutionality of section
21.05; 147 yet again, the appraisal district lost. Section 21.05(a) provides
that if a taxable commercial aircraft is used both in and out-of-state, the
135. Panola County Appraisal Dist. v. Panola County Fresh Water Supply Dist. No.
One, 69 S.W.3d 278 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.).
136. Id. at 280.
137. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.07 (Vernon 2002).
138. Panola County, 69 S.W.3d at 280.
139. Id. at 281.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.13 (Vernon 2002).
143. Panola County, 69 S.W.3d at 284-85.
144. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.13 (Vernon 2002). The court also addressed the juris-
dictional issue of whether the water district had standing to challenge the taxable values of
its lessees' property, given that it is not the water district that is liable for such tax. The
court concluded that the water district had standing because the appraisal district at-
tempted to place tax liens on the water district's property for unpaid taxes on the relevant
leasehold interests. Panola County, 69 S.W.3d at 283. This logic, however, seems some-
what tortured given that the water district is not liable for the property taxes on the lease-
hold interests.
145. Panola County, 69 S.W.3d at 286. This instruction is probably technically correct;
however, query whether the market value of a fee simple interest in property would be
materially different than the market value of a 99-year lease of the same property.
146. Tex-Air Helicopters, Inc. v. Galveston County Appraisal Review Bd., 76 S.W.3d
575 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied).
147. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 21.05 (Vernon 2002).
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appraisal district must allocate to Texas the portion of the aircraft's value
that fairly reflects its Texas use. 148 Section 21.05(b) 1 49 provides that the
portion of such value allocable to Texas is presumed to be a fraction that
takes into account the number of revenue departures from Texas. 150 The
Tex-Air case concerns helicopters that were situated in Texas but that reg-
ularly flew outside Texas boundaries.151 The appraisal district asserted
ostensibly different constitutional challenges to section 21.05 than had
been argued in an earlier case in which the Texas Supreme Court held the
statute to be constitutional. The appraisal district asserted that section
21.05 is constitutional only if the aircraft have a second situs other than
Texas, and that in this case at hand Tex-Air never established a second
situs for certain of its helicopters. 152 The court rejected this argument,
reasoning that evidence was introduced at trial that each of the helicop-
ters flew to the Outer Continental Shelf, which is not a Texas
jurisdiction. 153
The court also rejected the appraisal district's argument that the pre-
sumption that the allocation formula in section 21.05(b) is correct should
be overridden in the facts at hand. 154 The court agreed that the presump-
tion is rebuttable, but concluded that the presumption stands unless the
appraisal district (or taxpayer) presents evidence to rebut the presump-
tion.155 In Tex-Air, the appraisal district did not present such evidence at
trial. 156 Finally, the court rejected Tex-Air's assertion that section
42.29157 is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution.'5 8 Section 42.29 grants taxpayers attorneys'
fees in certain cases (i.e., excessive appraisal claims and unequal appraisal
claims), but not in cases in which the taxpayer prevails on a taxable allo-
cation argument. 159 Tex-Air believed that it should be reimbursed for
attorneys' fees in the first Tex-Air case because it prevailed. 60 The court,
however, concluded that Tex-Air did not meet the heavy burden of chal-
lenging a statute on an equal protection basis because it did not establish
148. Id. § 21.05(a).
149. Id. § 21.05(b).
150. Id.
151. Tex-Air, 76 S.W.3d at 578.
152. Id. at 584.
153. Id. at 585.
154. Id. at 588.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 589.
157. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.29 (Vernon 2002).
158. Tex-Air, 76 S.W.3d at 583; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
159. Tex-Air, 76 S.W.3d at 583.
160. Id. The appraisal district also argued again, in spite of the Texas Supreme Court
holding in the first Tex-Air case (Tex-Air Helicopters, Inc. v. Appraisal Review Bd. of Gal-
veston County, 970 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. 1998)), that section 21.05(b) is an improper exemp-
tion. Id. at 587. Again, the court differed, holding that the allocation formula is not an
exemption but is merely a method of allocating value to Texas, citing two Texas Supreme
Court cases standing for the proposition that an allocation formula is not an exemption.
Id.; see Enron Corp. v. Spring Indep. Sch. Dist., 922 S.W.2d 931, 940-41 (Tex. 1996); Hardin
v. Cent. Am. Life Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 881, 882-84 (Tex. 1964).
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that the statute was irrational; rather, the Texas Legislature theoretically
might reasonably have wanted to incentivize tax units to avoid unequal or
excessive appraisals.' 6'
A Houston Court of Appeals in Stuckey Diamonds, Inc. v. Harris
County Appraisal District'62 addressed the determination of taxable value
of inventory. Section 23.01163 provides that the market value of inven-
tory is the price for which it would sell as a unit to a purchaser who would
continue the business. 164 The taxpayer in Stuckey Diamonds, a whole-
saler and manufacturer of jewelry, rendered its inventory at 10% of
cost.1 65 Not surprisingly, the appraisal district valued the inventory much
higher (close to cost). 16 6 At trial, the taxpayer's expert appraised the in-
ventory at 57% of cost, but the trial court sided entirely with the ap-
praisal district's experts, who valued the inventory at 98% of cost (cost
minus a 2% discount to reflect clearance items and transportation
costs). 167 In upholding the trial court, the court of appeals appeared to
rely heavily on the appraisal district expert's statement that its research
showed that most sales of jewelry inventory by companies not in financial
straits were very close to cost.' 68 Indeed, the court remarked that the
best benchmark for valuing the inventory as a unit is the cost of each
item.169 This statement, by itself, seems inconsistent with section 23.01's
requirement that inventory must be valued as if it were sold as a unit.
Read in light of the appraiser's conclusion that jewelry inventory typically
sells at cost, however, it probably does not mean that the best method of
valuing inventory is to add up the total cost of the inventory.
In Letter Opinion JC-0571,' 70 the Attorney General addressed
whether a building owned by a municipal hospital authority and leased in
part to a private entity would be exempt from property tax under Article
VIII, section 2 of the Texas Constitution' 7' and section 11.11 of the Texas
Tax Code.' 72 These provisions essentially exempt from property tax
public property used for public purposes. 73 The Attorney General con-
cluded that no exemption applies unless the property is used exclusively
for public purposes, but noted that leasing a portion of the building to a
private entity does not necessarily foreclose the property from meeting
the public purpose test if the leased premises would continue to be used
161. Tex-Air, 76 S.W.3d at 583.
162. Stuckey Diamonds, Inc., v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 93 S.W.3d 212 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
163. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.01 (Vernon 2002).
164. Id.
165. Stuckey Diamonds, 93 S.W.3d at 213.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 214.
169. Id.
170. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. JC-0571 (2002).
171. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
172. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.11 (Vernon 2002).
173. Id.; TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
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wholly for the hospital's public purposes.1 74 The Attorney General stated
that the determination of whether the particular building at issue meets
the public purpose test is a facts and circumstances question that is not
addressed in Attorney General opinions. 175 The Attorney General's
most powerful conclusion, however, relates to section 262.004 of the
Health and Safety Code,'176 which provides that hospital property is ex-
empt from property tax because it is used for public purposes t 77 The
Attorney General implies that the Texas Legislature cannot by statute
classify property as necessarily used for a public purpose for purposes of
the property tax exemption; rather, such determination must be made on
a case-by-case basis. 1
78
B. PROCEDURE
In City of Pharr v. Boarder to Boarder Trucking, SVC, Inc.,179 the
Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that a letter sent in 1989 by a tax-
payer to the appraisal district complaining about the inclusion of tracts in
the appraisal was a valid protest, not only for the 1989 year, but also for
the following years. t80 In Pharr, the appraisal district taxed the taxpayer
on twelve vehicles and certain other property.' 8 ' The taxpayer asserted
that it protested the appraisal district's determination based on the letter;
the protest was denied. 182 The appraisal district ultimately filed suit to
collect delinquent property taxes on this property for the 1989-1995 tax
years. 183 The district court ruled that the taxpayer did not own the twelve
vehicles and reduced the delinquent tax bill accordingly.' 84 The appraisal
district appealed, arguing that the district court did not have jurisdiction
to address the ownership issue because the taxpayer failed to exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies by failing to protest taxes due.' 85 In rejecting the
appraisal district's argument, the court reasoned that the 1989 letter
served as a valid protest and that the letter was recognized as a protest by
the appraisal review board because it notified the taxpayer that its protest
had been denied. 186 Finally, the court stated that the taxpayer was not
required to send a protest letter for each year given that it was the same
twelve vehicles that were being taxed and challenged as not being owned
by the taxpayer.' 87
174. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. JC-0571 (2002).
175. Id.
176. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 262.004 (Vernon 2002).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. City of Pharr v. Boarder to Boarder Trucking, SVC, Inc., 76 S.W.3d 803 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied).
180. Id. at 806-07.




185. Id. at 806.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 806-07.
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A Houston Court of Appeals in Weingarten Realty Investors v. Harris
County Appraisal District8 8 affirmed the lower court's exclusion of the
taxpayer's expert concerning unequal valuation. 189 In Weingarten, the
taxpayer purchased a shopping center for $36 million; the appraisal dis-
trict appraised it for $30 million, and the taxpayer sued based on an une-
qual appraisal claim.' 90 Under section 42.26,191 a property's taxable
value must be reduced (even if it is appraised at market value or below) if
the property is appraised unequally as compared to a reasonable and rep-
resentative sample of similar properties in the appraisal district.192 The
taxpayer's position was based on the written opinion of its expert witness.
At trial, the appraisal district prevailed on its assertion that the testimony
of the taxpayer's expert should be excluded under the test for admissibil-
ity of expert witnesses set forth in E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
Robinson,193 in which the Texas Supreme Court held that in order for
expert testimony to be admissible (a) the expert must be qualified, and
(b) the testimony must be relevant and be based on a reliable founda-
tion. 194 The court of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding the taxpayer's expert because each of the follow-
ing facts, which were made known in cross-examination of the expert,
formed a satisfactory basis for the trial court to reject the expert's testi-
mony as unreliable: (i) his "comparable properties were significantly
smaller" than the subject property; (ii) 90% of the expert's "comparable
properties" had per- square-foot appraised values significantly lower than
that of the subject property; (iii) he used "only ten comparable properties
even though there were" almost 200 shopping centers in the area; (iv) his
adjustments to the "comparable properties considered only physical char-
acteristics;" and (v) "the percentage adjustment for each characteristic of
the comparable properties that differed from Champion's Village was
subjective."' 195
The trial court also rejected the taxpayer's expert based on its conclu-
sion that the expert's report did not comply with section 42.26(d). 196 Sec-
tion 42.26(d) provides that the court shall grant relief based on an
unequal appraisal if the appraised value of the property exceeds the me-
dian appraised value of a reasonable number of comparable properties
appropriately adjusted. 197 The appraisal district argued that section
42.26(d) requires independent market value appraisals, which the tax-
188. Weingarten Realty Investors v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 93 S.W.3d 280 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
189. Id. at 282.
190. Id.
191. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.26 (Vernon 2002).
192. Id.
193. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 556 (Tex. 1995).
194. Id.
195. Weingarten Realty Investors, 92 S.W.3d at 285-86.




payer's expert did not conduct. 198 The court of appeals rejected this con-
clusion, stating that the purpose of section 42.26(d) is to avoid the
necessity of market-value appraisals in unequal appraisal cases. 199 How-
ever, the court did not reverse the trial court on this issue because it did
not find that the trial court accepted the appraisal district's approach on
this issue.200
IV. PROCEDURE
Hearing Number 39,205,201 a sales tax hearing, offers an important evi-
dentiary perspective as the ALJ recognizes that documentary proof is not
always available. The taxpayer and the AHS disputed whether the tax-
payer had completed a particular sale. The AHS was not satisfied with
the taxpayer's internal memorandum indicating that the sale had never
been completed, nor with an affidavit that the sale had never been com-
pleted because of a dispute between buyer and seller as to the scope of
the project. Instead, the AHS insisted upon documentary evidence that
no sale had occurred. In a tribute to common sense, the ALJ noted:
"Given that Petitioner argues the sale was never completed, the Peti-
tioner is very unlikely to have documentary evidence relating to the
aborted transaction other than the defunct contract. Hence, the evidence
Petitioner has presented from two individuals within its organization that
the transaction was never completed is very compelling. 2 0 2 The decision
further noted that the AHS could rebut the taxpayer's proof, but that it
could not do so simply by arguing that the taxpayer must present docu-
mentary evidence. 20 3
On September 28, 2001, the Comptroller's office, by internal memo,
addressed a potential discrepancy in interpretation between its audit divi-
sion's and its tax policy division's views of Tax Code section 111.206.204
This section provides an exception to the statute of limitations for deter-
minations resulting from administrative proceedings. The audit division
interpretation, upheld by the internal memorandum, concluded that the
statute is a narrow one that extends the statute of limitations for refunds
only to the extent they are related to adjustments made by regulatory
agency, whereas the tax policy division took the position that section
111.206 keeps the limitation period open during the period involved in
the proceeding for refund claims, even if the claims are unrelated to the
regulatory adjustments. It will be interesting to see whether this statute is
198. Weingarten Realty Investors, 93 S.W.3d at 283.
199. Id. at 286-87.
200. Id.
201. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 39,205 (second decision upon rehearing Aug.
20, 2002).
202. Id.
203. This decision is particularly noteworthy given the increasingly common insistence
by some AHS attorneys that "documentary evidence" must be provided, even to prove a
negative - a difficult if not impossible task in many circumstances.
204. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.206 (Vernon 2002).
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subject to further challenge and questioning.20 5
United Services Automobile Ass'n v. Rylander206 focuses on whether an
insurance company is required to pay sales tax and certain other non-
insurance taxes. Relying on the literal language of the Texas Tax Code,
which provides that insurance taxes shall constitute "all taxes collectible
under the laws of Texas against any such insurance carrier," and provid-
ing that "no other tax shall be levied or collected" from such insurance
carriers,20 7 USAA argued that these provisions prohibit the state from
imposing other taxes, including sales taxes. USAA therefore filed a claim
for refund for certain sales and use taxes, motor vehicle taxes, TIF (Tele-
communications Infrastructure Fund taxes), and motor fuels taxes it had
paid during a multi-year period. The state argued that USAA's interpre-
tation would create an irreconcilable conflict between the Tax Code and
the Insurance Code, and that the Tax Code does not authorize exemp-
tions for taxes such as sales taxes by the insurance companies, so that no
refund should be due. The court ultimately concluded that USAA's reli-
ance on statutory language was not as compelling as the Comptroller's
arguments, and ruled for the Comptroller.
Hearing Number 39,565208 is proof that being a "large, sophisticated
taxpayer" does not automatically preclude penalty waiver. Under the
factual circumstances discussed in this letter, the ALJ recommended the
penalty waiver be granted for the portion of the assessment related to
officer and director compensation adjustment. Comptroller's Rule
1.40209 provides standards for determining the circumstances in which
penalty or interest should be waived. Although the list includes several
factors, the Comptroller's auditors and hearings attorneys frequently as-
serted and prevailed on the assertion that a large sophisticated taxpayer
that makes significant errors must not have exercised reasonable dili-
gence and therefore is not entitled to penalty waiver. This case shows
that taxpayers are not always on the losing side of that argument. 210
The Comptroller also amended some of the tax administration rules
during the Survey21' period as part of the Comptroller's effort to update
and bring current her rules.
V. CONCLUSION
Figures released by the Comptroller's office shortly after the Survey
period predicted a $9.9 billion shortfall. Numbers released earlier indi-
cated that the state would see lower than expected sales taxes and could
205. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Letter No. 200109582L (Sept. 28, 2001).
206. Plaintiff's First Amended Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 3, United
Servs. Auto Ass'n, , No. GN103414 (345th Dist. Ct. Travis County, Tex. May 13, 2002).
207. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. ART. 4.10 § 14 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
208. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 39,565 (Feb. 6, 2002).
209. 19 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 1.40 (West 2002).
210. Just most of the time.
211. See, e.g., 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.9 (West 2003) (concerning electronic filing of
returns and reports and electronic payments).
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lose several million dollars during the next budget cycle from Texas com-
panies that have structured around the Texas franchise tax, adding mo-
mentum to lawmakers' efforts to overhaul the state's franchise tax
system. Those of us who participated in the 1997 legislative session, the
last session that focused heavily on proposals to extend the franchise tax
to partnerships and/or corporate limited partners, know how ugly this
fight can be. In response to past attacks on the structure of the franchise
tax, many Texas taxpayers and legislators have correctly noted that the
current franchise tax structure encourages companies to keep their head-
quarters, and their businesses, in Texas. This consideration, combined
with the fact that the Texas Constitution prohibits an individual income
tax and the "no new taxes" campaigns that so many of the legislators rely
on, will make the Legislature's task of balancing the budget challenging.
Additionally, the Legislature may have difficulty addressing (yet again)
the myriad property tax and school funding issues that appear each ses-
sion. The Legislature's approach to its budget balancing tasks, including
changes made to the Texas Tax Code, will provide interesting fodder for
next year's Survey.
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